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INTRODUCTION
This case involves a 65 year old man who was injured on the job, sustained
permanent injuries, and could not return to work. Mr. Enrique Martinez sustained injuries
to his neck, right shoulder, and right hand, rendering him unable to use his right hand
effectively. Mr. Martinez applied for, and was granted Social Security disability benefits
as of the date of his accident.
Mr. Martinez also applied for permanent total disability benefits with the Labor
Commission. At his hearing, Mr. Martinez presented evidence concerning his injuries,
his job duties as a fast food worker, and expert vocational evidence, showing that Mr.
Martinez could not return to work, could not perform the essential functions of a fast food
worker, and could not perform other work reasonably available. At the same hearing,
Respondent's only witness admitted that there were no jobs Mr. Martinez could perform
with his injuries. Nonetheless, the ALJ ignored this evidence and denied Mr. Martinez's
claim for benefits.
Mr. Martinez filed a Motion for Review with the Labor Commission, to reverse
the ALJ's denial of benefits. In response to Mr. Martinez's motion for review, the Labor
Commission denied Mr. Martinez's claims, and made the same glaring omissions as the
ALJ. Specifically, the Order failed to consider the undisputed evidence concerning the
essential functions of a fast food worker, and that those functions require at least average
ability to use both hands. Nor did the Order consider the observed limitations found in
Mr. Martinez's functional capacity evaluation. Nor did the Order consider Respondent's
ii

admission that there were no jobs - - fast food or otherwise, that Mr. Martinez could
perform. Consequently, the Order failed to disclose the steps it took in analyzing the
evidence, and ultimately denying Mr. Martinez's claims.
This court should reverse the Labor Commission's Order, and find that Mr.
Martinez satisfied his burden of proof, demonstrating that as a result of his industrial
accident, he can no longer perform the essential functions of a fast food worker, and that
there is no other work reasonably available to him. Alternatively, this Court should at
minimum, remand this case to the Labor Commission for additional findings of fact,
consistent with this Court's order and the evidence introduced in the case.

in
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This Court has jurisdiction to hear Mr. Martinez1 s appeal because the Labor
Commission has engaged in action that is arbitrary or capricious. Utah Code Ann. § 634(tb
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner/Appellant, Mr. Enrique Martinez, briefly worked for Media-Paymasters
as an extra on a movie set. Mr. Martinez also held a second job at McDonald's as a fast
food worker. On 10/28/96, Mr. Martinez sustained significant permanent injuries when
he fell down some stairs while working for Media-Paymasters. Mr. Martinez injured his
neck, right shoulder, and right hand in the accident. Mr. Martinez filed and application
for hearing, asking the Labor Commission to award him time loss, medical treatment
benefits, and an permanent impairment award as a result of his industrial accident. The
Commission found that Mr. Martinez had sustained the injuries described above and
found that he had sustained measurable permanent impairment as a result of his industrial
accident. Media-Paymasters paid the benefits due under the Order.
Mr. Martinez attempted to return to work, both at Media-Paymasters and at
McDonald's, but neither employer was willing to accommodate his limitations from his
work injuries. Mr. Martinez applied for Social Security benefits and was awarded those
benefits as of the day of his industrial accident.
Mr. Martinez then filed and application for hearing asking the Commission to find
that he was permanently and totally disabled from his industrial injuries sustained at
Media-Paymasters.
Based on the law in effect on the day of Mr. Martinez's accident, permanent total
disability claims envision a multiple hearing process. At the first hearing, Petitioners
must demonstrate that: they were injured by accident in course and scope of the
vii

employer's employment; they sustained injuries that limit their ability to do basic work
activities; that those limitations prevent them from performing the essential functions of
jobs they were qualified to do at the time of the injury; and, that no other work is
reasonably available. If Petitioners sustains their burden of proof, the burden then shifts
to the employer to develop an reemployment plan, or simply pay permanent total
disability benefits.
At Mr. Martinez's hearing, it was established that Mr. Martinez had sustained a
significant injury in the course and scope of his employment at Media-Paymasters that
limited his ability to do basic work activities. Therefore, the issues in the case were
whether Mr. Martinez's job injuries prevented him from performing the essential
functions of his job, and if so, whether there was any work reasonably available to Mr.
Martinez.
On 5/3/01, Mr. Martinez presented evidence of his claim for permanent total
disability benefits before the ALJ.
On 7/15/03, the ALJ issued his findings of fact, conclusions of law and order. The
ALJ denied Mr. Martinez's claim for permanent total disability benefits. Mr. Martinez
filed a motion for review with the Labor Commission, asking the Commission to reverse
the ALJ's order. On 6/15/04, the Labor Commission affirmed the denial of Mr.
Martinez's claim, while acknowledging the deficiencies of the ALJ's prior order.
On 7/13/04 Mr. Martinez filed his Petition for Review of Order, and this appeal
followed.
viii

FACTS
1.

On 10/28/96, Mr. Enrique Martinez was injured while working for MediaPaymasters as an extra on a movie set when he slipped and fell down some stairs,
landing on his right hand. The Labor Commission found that Mr. Martinez injured
his neck, right shoulder, and right hand in the accident. Mr. Martinez worked parttime for McDonalds at the time of the accident. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Order (3/29/00), included in Appellant's Appendix at 4.

2.

The Labor Commission acknowledged Mr. Martinez's right hand problems
since the industrial accident:
In the morning, the fingers of Mr. Martinez's right hand may
feel numb. This involves the first three fingers and they also
seem weak, so that he may drop things. This occurs
occasionally on the left, but chiefly on the right. If he uses a
hammer, the whole hand feels weak. He gives examples
where he used to drive a six penny nail with one hand, he now
has to use both hands.
The Labor Commission's Medical Panel Report is included in Appellant's
Appendix at 6.

3.

The Commission's conclusions were consistent with the opinions of Mr.
Martinez's doctors. Dr. Dennis Wyman's 3/1/98 note stated:
1.

Neck pain: The patient has decreased range of motion
and posterior neck pain with pain radiating into the
upper back. Also, numbness is noted in the right
thumb and index finger on an intermittent basis.

MRE 280 (emphasis added). Dr. Wyman diagnosed Mr. Martinez with "cervical
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strain/sprain with probable C5-6 disc herniation on the right side." Dr. Wyman's
records are included in Appellant's App. at 21.
Mr. Martinez assigned a 3% whole person impairment ("wpi") rating for his
cervical spine, due to a "medically documented injury, persisting symptoms, mild
degenerative changes, and permanent activity restrictions." Id. at 13. The
Commission also assigned a 6% wpi rating for his right shoulder because of right
shoulder limitations as a result of his 10/28/96 industrial accident. Id. The Panel
also assigned a 3% impairment rating for Mr. Martinez's low back injury due to
"medically documented injury with persisting symptoms and (mild) (Moderate)
degenerative changes, and permanent activity restrictions." Id.
On 10/24/00, Mr. Martinez completed Respondent's functional capacity
evaluation with Mr. Davis. According to Mr. Davis, Mr. Martinez scored "well
below the SEDENTARY level" on the Epic Hand Function Sort. Appellant's App.
at 29. Mr. Martinez's demonstrated abilities scored below 1% of the normal
population on his right hand grip strength test. Id. at 20. Mr. Martinez could stand
for only eighteen minutes, and could only walk on the treadmill for six minutes,
and stopped due to cervical and lumbar pain. Id. at 19. Despite these limitations,
Mr. Davis categorized Mr. Martinez in the "LIGHT" category of work. But
according to Mr. Davis, "[d]ue to self limitation and reported pain, most activities
in [Mr. Martinez's] evaluation would be more consistent with a SEDENTARY
work level." Id. at 22. Mr. Davis did not testify at the hearing. Mr. Martinez
x

testified that he gave a good effort during the FCE. Appellant App. at 43. A copy
of the hearing transcript is included in Appellant's Appendix.
At the time of his accident, Mr. Martinez's job duties at McDonald's included
cleaning, making sandwiches, preparing bread, mopping, sweeping, taking out the
garbage (20-35 pounds,3-4xday), and required him to bend, stoop, and kneel
down. Mr. Martinez testified that all McDonald's employees had to mop, sweep,
and take out the garbage. Appellant App. at 36-7.
Mr. Martinez testified that after he was medically stable from his injuries, he
contacted both Media-Paymasters and McDonald's, and asked if he could return to
work with his limitations. Media-Paymasters was not willing to hire Mr. Martinez.
Mr. Martinez's former supervisor Lavon, told him that they had no light duty
positions, and that all employees had to do some of the following: take out
garbage, mop, sweep, clean, bend, stoop, etc. Appellant App. at 37.
Mr. Martinez also testified that he asked Lavon about the cashier position.
Mr. Martinez testified that the cashier position would require cashiering for an
hour, then clean and do other activities, and that cashiers did not do exclusively
cashier work for a full shift. Appellant App. at 38.
Mr. Martinez testified that he was unable to perform his prior job at
McDonalds. Appellant App. at 38.
After McDonalds and Media Paymasters declined to re-hire Mr. Martinez, he
applied for social security disability benefits. The Social Security Administration
xi

found that Mr. Martinez was disabled and awarded him disability benefits as of the
day of his industrial accident. A copy of the Social Security transmittal letter is
attached in Appellant's App. at 80.
11.

Mr. Martinez has not worked at any job since his industrial accident.
Appellant's App. at 36.

12.

Mr. Martinez testified that after retiring from his former work as a
maintenance worker, he did not want to retire from the workforce, and that was
why he went back to work for both McDonald's and Media-Paymaster.
Appellant's App. at 38.

13.

Kristy Farnsworth, Ph.D, testified as to Mr. Martinez' inability to find work
due to his industrial limitations. Dr. Farnsworth first considered Mr. Martinez's
past work to determine what skills, if any, could transfer. Dr. Farnsworth
concluded that Mr. Martinez's past work skills as a maintenance worker were not
transferable. Dr. Farnsworth's report is included in Appellant's Appendix at 84.

14.

Dr. Farnsworth then examined Mr. Martinez's functional capacity from the
FCE. Appellant's App. at 49. She then looked for unskilled jobs in the light
capacity with a limited ability to walk and stand, and with limited finger dexterity,
and found none in Utah. Id.

15.

Dr. Farnsworth specifically considered whether Mr. Martinez could return to
work as a fast food worker. Dr. Farnsworth considered Mr. Martinez's results
from the VALPAR assembly test during the FCE. That test concluded that Mr.
xii

Martinez's manual dexterity was "Poor." Appellant's App. at 28.l Dr.
Farnsworth also considered Mr. Martinez's medical records. Appellant's App. at
52. Dr. Farnsworth testified that fast food workers need to have at least an
"average" level of finger dexterity to perform the essential functions of those
position at a competitive level, and that Mr. Martinez lacked that ability. Id.
16.

Dr. Farnsworth also considered whether any accommodations could be made
to help Mr. Martinez find work. She concluded that there were no
accommodations that could improve Mr. Martinez's manual dexterity. Based on
the foregoing, as well as Mr. Martinez' age of 61 (at the time of his hearing), Dr.
Farnsworth concluded that training someone Mr. Martinez' age was not feasible.
Appellant's App. at 50.

17.

Ms. Kit Bertsch testified for Respondents, and was Respondent's only
witness.

18.

Based on Mr. Martinez's past employment, Ms. Bertsch only considered fast
food jobs in preparation for the hearing. Appellant's App. at 60.

19.

On direct examination, Ms. Bertsch testified that Mr. Martinez could only
work at "modified" jobs, as opposed to past work or currently available work:
Atty: So, in your opinion, based on your
reports, there are jobs reasonably
available that Mr. Martinez can perform

1

An person with average manual dexterity would score 100%, Appellant's
App. at 49. Mr. Martinez scored only 45%.
xm

Ms. Bertsch: I think based on modification of
the same job, or modification of a
different job at the same site.
Yes.
Appellant's App. at 60 (emphasis added)
20.

Ms. Bertsch also conceded that there were no jobs that Mr. Martinez could
perform with his limitations, and that any job for Mr. Martinez would have to be
"created" by any potential employer:
Atty: I understood the crux of your testimony
[is] that all of the jobs that you claim Mr.
Martinez could perform do not exist at this
point, but instead would have to be creations,
modifications, changes in existing jobs; did I get
that right?
Ms. Bertsch: Yes, they would be modifications
based on what the employer said.
Atty: Right. We're not talking about existing
jobs; we're talking about jobs that would be
created effectively by the employer by changing
the current jobs; do I have that right or not?
Ms. Bertsch: Correct.
Atty: So you're not testifying that there are jobs
currently available for Mr. Martinez to go out
and take; instead, you're testimony is that all the
jobs you think [Mr. Martinez] could take would
have to be created by employers; is that correct?
Bertsch: Correct.
Appellant's App. at 61.

21.

Approximately two years after the evidentiary hearing, the ALJ denied Mr.
XIV

Martinez's claim for permanent total disability benefits. Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order (7/15/03) included in Appellant's App. at 118.
22.

Mr. Martinez filed a Motion for Review with the Labor Commission, asserting
that the undisputed evidence - - including Respondent's own FCE and its expert
who admitted there were no jobs he could perform - - showed that Mr. Martinez
was entitled to permanent total disability benefits.

23.

The Labor Commission denied Mr. Martinez's motion, holding that Mr.
Martinez could return to his job as a fast food worker, notwithstanding his "poor"
ability to use his hands, as demonstrated on Respondent's FCE. The Order ignored
Mr. Martinez's functional limits demonstrated during Respondent's FCE, except to
recite the FCE's conclusion that Mr. Martinez can perform work in the "Light"
category of work. The Order does not mention Respondent's admission that Mr.
Martinez can not perform any jobs. Order Denying Motion for Review (6/15/04),
included in Appellant's Appendix at 126.

xv

ARGUMENT
THE ORDER FAILED TO CONSIDER MATERIAL EVIDENCE,
INCLUDING THE WORK LIMITATIONS SHOWN IN THE
FUNCTIONAL CAPACITY EVALUATION, AND UNDISPUTED
EVIDENCE THAT THERE WERE NO JOBS MR. MARTINEZ
COULD PERFORM, AND THEREFORE, THE ORDER LACKED
SUFFICIENT DETAIL TO DISCLOSE THE STEPS THE
COMMISSION TOOK IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER COULD
PERFORM THE ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS OF A FAST FOOD
WORKER.
As set forth in the Order, the central issues in the case were whether Mr. Martinez
could still perform the essential functions of his job, and if not, whether there was other
work reasonably available that he could perform. Utah Code Ann. § 34-A-2 (413).
Although Mr. Martinez presented compelling and undisputed evidence on both points,
there is no indication from the Order that the Commission even considered that evidence.
It is well established that administrative agencies must make specific findings of fact that
show the steps it took in reaching its conclusion. Instead, the Order simply ignored the
undisputed evidence that showed Mr. Martinez was entitled to a preliminary finding of
permanent total disability under the Act. This sections points out the evidence that the
Order failed to consider, and demonstrates that Mr. Martinez is entitled to a preliminary
finding of permanent total disability under the evidence presented at the hearing.
JL

The Facts Showed that Mr. Martinez Could Not Perform The Essential
Functions of a Fast Food Worker Because His Industrial Injuries Limited
His Ability to Use His Hands.
A.

Mr. Martinez Presented Uncontradicted Testimony That His Job
Required Him To Use Both Hands.

Mr. Martinez showed that he could not perform the essential functions of a fast

food worker due to his work injuries, because the essential functions of a fast food worker
requires average ability to use of both hands. First, Mr. Martinez testified that his duties
included cleaning, making sandwiches, preparing bread, mopping, sweeping, taking out
the garbage (20-35 pounds,3-4xday). Mr. Martinez testified that all employees had to
mop, sweep and take out the garbage - even cashiers. Facts f 6. All activities described
by Mr. Martinez required the ability to use both hands.
B.

Dr. Farnsworth's Testimony Was Undisputed That Fast Food
Workers Must Have At Least Average Ability To Use Both
Hands.

Dr. Farnsworth testified that Martinez's physical limitations prevented him from
performing the essential functions of a fast food worker. Dr. Farnsworth explained that
the essential functions of a fast food worker require at least "average" manual dexterity to
perform at a competitive level. This stands to reason: no employer in a competitive
business setting would choose to hire an employee who could not use both hands where
the work involved manual labor, including making food items, cleaning, and cashiering.
To the contrary, no employer would hire or retain an employee who could not perform
these tasks on at least an average level.
C.

Respondent's Functional Capacity Evaluation Showed That Mr.
Martinez Could Not Perform The Essential Functions of a Fast
Food Worker.

Respondents' own FCE demonstrated that Martinez lacked the physical capacity to
perform the essential functions of a fast food worker. Before showing how the FCE
results precluded Mr. Martinez from performing those functions, some general
2

background information is necessary.
Generally, functional capacity evaluations, or "FCE's" describe the physical
activities and tolerances demonstrated during a one or two day examination. These
specific activity tolerances are then used to determine whether employees are physically
capable of performing a particular job. In addition to determining specific physical
tolerances, the FCE may also describe a person's general work category according to
Department of Labor standards, such as "sedentary, light, or medium" category of work.
The work category can not not stand alone; it must be considered along with the
employee's specific activity tolerances. See, e.g., Appellant's App. at 80-82. Put another
way, an employee who may be categorized in the "light" work category, is not necessarily
able to perform the full range of work in that category. Instead, the work category is a
generalized starting point. Then, the employee's specific work tolerances must be
considered to determine whether certain tasks - and therefore, certain jobs requiring
those tasks - must be eliminated. See, e.g., Appellant's App. at 90-3. In this case, the
Labor Commission only considered the general category of work from the FCE, and not
Mr. Martinez's demonstrated limitations which precluded him from returning to work as a
fast food worker.
Mr. Martinez's FCE demonstrated his significant work limitations. During the
FCE, Mr. Martinez' manual dexterity was determined to be "poor." Facts ^15. Although
he was able to sit for long periods, his standing was limited to twelve minutes (static) and
18 minutes (dynamic). Appellant's App. at 26. Mr. Martinez lifted and carried twenty
3

pounds once, but had trouble holding onto and gripping the weight with his right hand.
Because Mr. Martinez lifted and carried twenty pounds once, he fell into the general
category of "LIGHT Physical Demand Characteristic of Work Level." Appellant's App.
at 29. Mr. Davis admitted, however, that due to Mr. Martinez's observed self-limitation
and reported pain, Mr. Martinez's abilities "would be more consistent with a
SEDENTARY work level." Id. Despite these observed functional limits, the Order
simply failed to consider them in concluding that Mr. Martinez could perform the
essential functions of a fast food worker.
D.

The Order Failed To Consider the Functional Limits
Demonstrated During the FCE.

The Order demonstrated a fundamental misunderstanding of the limitations shown
in Mr. Martinez's Functional Capacity Evaluation, or "FCE." Instead of considering the
specific limitations shown by the FCE, the Order summarily concluded that ''Mr.
Martinez has the physical ability to perform light work." Appellant's App. at 119. The
Order also stated that the FCE "documented substantial symptom magnification" by Mr.
Martinez, but failed to state how any alleged magnification affected the observed
tolerances during the evaluation. Nor did the Order point out that Mr. Davis, the physical
therapist hired by Respondents to perform the FCE, was not present at the hearing to
explain his beliefs about alleged symptom magnification, and be subjected to crossexamination. The Order also failed to explain the significance of the alleged symptom
magnification - yet the Order found that Mr. Martinez could work in the Light category,
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and not the Sedentary category, as observed during the evaluation. Apart from the
generalized work category, the Order also failed to explain why it did not consider the
specific limitations demonstrated during the FCE.
The Order cited conflicting opinions as to Mr. Martinez's functional abilities, but
still found them to be "accurate descriptions of Mr. Martinez's true abilities." Appellant's
App. at 120. The other work restrictions cited in the Order were provided by Mr.
Martinez's orthopedist approximately three and one half years before the hearing,
Appellant's App. at 132. Compare with Appellant's App. at 133. Those general
restrictions specifically contradicted the observed limitations of the FCE. The Order
never mentioned the conflicting views of Mr. Martinez's limitations. Ordinarily,
important conflicts involving medical facts - such as functional limits from work injuries
- are sent to a medical panel. Utah Code Ann § 34A-2-601. The Order's failure to
consider Mr. Martinez's observed limitations during the FCE also prevented it from
recognizing any potential conflict. It is impossible to determine from the Order why Mr.
Martinez's observed work limitations were not considered.
Apart from the objective observations in the FCE, the Order flatly ignored
Respondent's admission that there were no jobs that Mr. Martinez could perform in
finding that he could still perform the essential functions of a fast food worker.
E.

The Order Ignored Respondent's Admission That There Were
No Jobs That Mr, Martinez Could Perform, Including Fast Food
Jobs.

Respondent's admission that there were no jobs Mr. Martinez could perform
5

demonstrated that he could not perform the essential functions of a fast food worker. As
set forth in the facts section, Respondent's expert witness, Ms. Kit Bertsch, repeatedly
conceded that there were no jobs Mr. Martinez could perform. Ms. Bertsch first testified
that Mr. Martinez could still work as a fast food worker. But when she was specifically
asked whether Mr. Martinez could perform the essential functions of a fast food worker,
she admitted that any fast job would require "modification of the same job, or
modification of a different job . . . " Facts at f 19. Consequently, Respondent failed to
rebut the evidence that showed Mr. Martinez could not perform the essential functions of
a fast food worker. Ms. Bertsch then admitted that Mr. Martinez was unable to work at
any existing jobs, and that instead, an employer would have to specifically create a job for
him. Facts at 120.
Put simply, given that there are fast food jobs available to qualified applicants, Ms.
Bertsch's admission that there were no jobs that Mr. Martinez could perform shows that
he is not able to perform the essential functions of a fast food worker. Further, Ms.
Bertsch's admission that any potential employer would have to specifically create or
modify an existing job to accommodate Mr. Martinez's work limitations, further
demonstrates that Mr. Martinez can not perform the essential functions of a fast food
worker.2

2

Ms. Bertsch's admission also shows that unlike the Order, Respondent's
expert witness could not ignore the specific limitations of the FCE in concluding that
there were no jobs Mr. Martinez could perform.
6

2,

Respondent's Admissions Also Showed That There Was No Work
Reasonably Available to Mr. Martinez.

Those same admissions also showed that Mr. Martinez could not perform "other
work reasonably available" under the Statute. The Act requires petitioners to show that
there is no other work reasonably available, considering his age, education, work
experience, medical capacity and residual functional capacity. Utah Code Ann. 34A-2413(a)(iv), also known as "Step (iv)." Under Step (iv), an employee must show that there
is no work reasonably available. The Commission's own rules require that at minimum,
reasonably available work must be "regular, steady, and readily available."3 Reasonably
available work must exist to be "available," let alone "reasonably available." This
underlying assumption has been recognized by every court that has interpreted the
availability of work under the permanent total disability statute.4 Conversely, no court
has interpreted reasonably available work to mean imaginary or hypothetical jobs. In Mr.
Martinez's case, Respondent conceded that no jobs existed that he could perform. Taken

3

R612-l-10(D)(l)(b). This rule became effective on 12/15/02, about one
year and eight months after the hearing, but about five months before the Order was
issued. Martinez asserts that the Rule simply helped codify the boundaries of reason in
determining permanent total disability claims. Any interpretation of "reasonably
available" work must first require that some specific work exists that Petitioner can
perform.
4

See, e.g., Smith v. Mitv Lite. 939 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah App 1997) (work
must exist in stable job market); Hoskings v. Indus. Comm'n. 918 P.2d 150, 157 (Utah
App 1996) (requiring actual, not hypothetical, job).
7

together with the other consistent testimony and reports5, the Order should have found
that Mr. Martinez satisfied step (iv) under the Act.
Remarkably, the Order failed to even mention Respondents' damaging admissions,
although they were specifically emphasized in Mr. Martinez's Motion for Review. It is
impossible to determine from the Order whether the Commission even considered this
otherwise fatal evidence to Respondents, let alone what weight, if any, was assigned in
consciously rejecting it. These admissions were critical because they went to the central
issues in the case, namely, whether Mr. Martinez could perform the essential functions of
his job, and whether there was other work reasonably available.
3^

The Order's Failure to Consider Uncontradicted and Compelling Material
Evidence Rendered it Inadequate as a Matter of Law.

The Order failed to make the detailed findings of fact required to support its
conclusions. As the Supreme Court stated in Milne Truck Lines, Inc. v. Public Service
Comm'n.. 720 P.2d 1373 (Utah 1986):
The importance of complete, accurate, and consistent findings
of fact is essential to a proper determination by an
administrative agency. To that end, findings should be
sufficiently detailed to disclose the steps by which the
ultimate factual conclusions, or conclusions of mixed fact and
law, are reached. Without such findings, this Court cannot
perform its duty of reviewing [ALJs'] order in accordance
with established legal principles and of protecting the parties
and the public from arbitrary and capricious administrative

5

See testimony of Dr. Farnsworth that there are no jobs that Mr. Martinez
could perform, and that training him would not be feasible, given that he was 61 years old
at the time of the hearing. Facts at f 16.
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action.6
Where the Order simply ignored undisputed evidence, as here, the Order lacked
"sufficiently detailed [findings] to disclose the steps by which . . . conclusions of mixed
fact and law, are reached." Id. Under Milne, the Order is inadequate as a matter of law
and should be reversed. This Court should find as a matter of law that Martinez could
not perform the essential functions of a fast food worker, nor was there any work
reasonably available for him, and thereby satisfied Step (iii) and (iv).

6

Adams v. Indus. Comm'n.. 821 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting Milne
Truck Lines, Inc. v. Public Service Comm'n.. 720 P.2d 1373 (Utah 1986) with approval)
(internal citations omitted).
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, this Court should reverse the Commission's Order
denying him permanent total disability benefits. Alternatively, this Court should, at
minimum, remand Mr. Martinez's claim for additional factual findings consistent with
this Court's Order and the evidence presented in the case.
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DATED this 3-? day of December, 2004.
KING, BURKE & SCHAAP, P.C.

Richard R. Burke
Attorneys for Petitioner
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